Afghanistan, Britain and the US - Special Relationship Tested

London
The killing in Afghanistan of eight British soldiers in twenty-four hours at the end of last week has heightened debate over involvement in the war and underscored the very human costs. Pictures of the generally very young British troopers lost are prominent in the media. Beleaguered Prime Minister Gordon Brown is facing sharp attacks from opposition Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.
Nonetheless, British public support for this war holds. A poll by the firm ICM for the BBC and ‘The Guardian’ newspaper shows an even division, with 46 percent supporting and 47 percent opposed.
The last ICM poll on this topic in 2006 showed support at 31 and opposition at 53 percent. British forces have since nearly completely withdrawn from Iraq, a consistently very unpopular war. Since World War II, the British public generally has not favored substantial military engagements overseas. Even the decisively successful 1982 Falklands War with Argentina over the Falkland Islands initially lacked strong public support.
Yet Britain is a vital ally of the United States in Afghanistan, as elsewhere. “Someone to talk to” is how McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s national security adviser, described this rapport. Fundamental affinity helped forge an enduring special relationship during the total struggle of World War II.
That nation’s history testifies to distinctive strengths in secret operations and unconventional conflicts. The British Empire survived in part through an exceptionally sophisticated global intelligence network. Ian Fleming’s James Bond and John le Carré’s more introspective agents are fiction and film exaggerations which nonetheless reflect reality.
During World War II, Gen. Orde Wingate became widely respected for intensity and effectiveness in leading the special Chindits force against the Japanese in Southeast Asia. An American counterpart, Merrill’s Marauders, was inspired in part by this British example. Again, real experiences were soon translated into commando exploits by novelists and screenwriters.
After the war, the British and Australians successfully fought Communist insurgents in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. Sir Robert Thompson, a Malaya commander and Chindit vet, was sought out by President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger for advice on Vietnam strategy. The resulting emphasis on small unit actions, and specific targeted killings, was acknowledged later by Vietnamese revolutionaries to have been highly effective.
Former Australia Army Lt. Col David Kilcullen, a respected counterinsurgency expert, currently works for the U.S. government, focused on Afghanistan. His blunt criticism of past policy, or lack thereof, has given him considerable prominence. The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has spent his entire career in special operations.
While media commentary on Afghanistan regularly refers to the disastrous Soviet invasion and consequent defeat in the 1980s, the more complex very long-term history of British engagement is generally neglected. Over decades of the 19th century, separate sizable British military expeditions experienced frustration in Afghanistan; one was completely wiped out.
However, London eventually was successful in achieving a stable, tolerable regime in Kabul through economic incentives combined with military occupation. The paramount lesson is not to rely on military force alone. Last summer the Group of Eight foreign ministers agreed on approximately four billion dollars in new aid to Afghanistan, concentrated in tribal areas bordering Pakistan where insurgents are strong. There is other encouraging news, including evidence of continued significant economic growth.
There is also consensus that Afghanistan requires a very long-term effort. In this Allied operation, British collaboration is vital.
Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College in Wisconsin and author of ‘After the Cold War’ (NYU Press and Macmillan). He can be reached at acyr@carthage.edu