International: Nukes and North Korea

“Balance of Power Politics and the Korean Peninsula”?
by Arthur I. Cyr
The decision to open North Korea’s nuclear facility to United Nations inspection may prove to be more than just another move in an endless game of chicken. Over the years, Pyongyang has become masterful at creating crises by approaching the brink of war, only to step back, usually in return for substantial economic concessions.
The high stakes involved are self-evident. The Korean War of 1950-53 took an estimated one million lives, brought direct combat between American and Chinese forces, and devastated the Korean Peninsula. In U.S. politics, the conflict demolished public support for the Truman administration and fed anti-communist hysteria.
Another war would devastate the Koreas once again, greatly disrupt international politics, and might go nuclear. Additionally, the U.S. is now mired in Iraq, with precious few forces to spare for any additional war.
This time, two developments in the wider context of the Korean crisis and accord are distinctive. First, international financial pressure spearheaded by the United States clearly has been instrumental in forcing flexibility on the rigid communist regime. In March, the Bush administration declared Banco Delta Asia (BDA), based in Macau, a renegade institution assisting illegal financial activities by Pyongyang. U.S. businesses were banned from dealing with BDA, and others followed suit. Macau government authorities froze $25 million in North Korean funds.
Washington then offered to facilitate return of the funds to Pyongyang in return for nuclear flexibility. This transfer has been carried out by BDA, reportedly with assistance from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the central bank of Russia and a small private Russian bank, the Far East Commercial Bank.
Second, in the wake of this nuclear-financial negotiation, the Pyongyang regime on June 19 launched another missile over the waters between South Korea and Japan. According to intelligence officials in both countries, the missile had a range of approximately 100 kilometers. This is the third such test since May, and reflects a now well-established North Korean propensity to flex airborne muscle in the direction of Japan, the hated former colonial ruler.
Such a move in the midst of new nuclear flexibility nonetheless seems anomalous, and may be a sign of infighting within North Korea. Cracks in the rigid totalitarian face of the regime could complicate but also facilitate efforts to reach a nuclear agreement. Trigger-happy missile launchers among military extremists may force more moderate factions to rally around Pyongyang’s current efforts to reach a fresh nuclear understanding with other powers.
The promising nuclear atmosphere also has highlighted infighting directly related to the Bush administration. President Bush has made clear his very strong support for the agreement, which directly reflects the efforts of the State Department and, specifically, chief negotiator Christopher Hill. Bluntly rejecting criticism of the agreement by John Bolton, his former UN ambassador, and other neoconservatives, Bush underscored the importance of ”˜more than one voice’ sitting down and negotiating.
President Bush’s praise of multilateral diplomacy, and the importance of allies, has particular resonance in this part of the world, where South Korea, China, Japan and Russia along with the U.S. have played roles in the current breakthrough.
Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College and author of ”˜After the Cold War’ (NYU Press and Palgrave/Macmillan). He can be reached at acyr@carthage.edu