French Election - A Change, Not Necessarily Better

“The Significance of the French Elections for U.S. Policies — and U.S. Problems”?
Arthur I. Cyr
The election of French free market presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy has been welcomed by many Americans, including the Bush White House. The assumption that this leader of the political right in France is automatically right for U.S. interests is commonly held — and wrong.
American media focus heavily on Sarkozy campaign promises to privatize industry and energize security-conscious workers. His party, the Union for a Popular Movement, is also the party of retiring French President Jacques Chirac. The new president’s emphasis on change created distance from his relatively unpopular predecessor, but he also did not advocate a shift in France’s stance toward Iraq.
Sarkozy tough talk contrasted with Socialist Party nominee Ségolène Royal, who stressed softer themes of caring for those in need and values beyond all-consuming competition in the marketplace.
Pointedly, however, she did not stress socialism’s traditional twins of class warfare and economic nationalization. Steadily expanding long-term prosperity mutes the former, and state enterprises are viewed more with frustration than fascination.
Domestic policies in FranceFranceFacts, however, have relatively little direct impact in the U.S., while foreign policy is a different matter. We should remember, first, that France is among our most durable allies. During the American Revolution, Benjamin Franklin About Ben Franklin played an historic role in wooing and winning French public as well as royal opinion, which led to crucial military as well as financial assistance.
Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 French aircraft joined those of other NATO allies in patrolling the skies over North America. The struggle against al Qaeda and the Taliban remains a comprehensive collective enterprise, authorized and supported by the United Nations as well as the NATO alliance. This commitment transcends party lines in France.
Second, conservative regimes in Paris have often challenged Washington. Throughout the 1950’s, generally cooperative socialist governments in Paris facilitated American leadership in Europe and elsewhere.
More recently, long-time Socialist President Francois Mitterrand was pragmatic in dealing with the United States. President Ronald Reagan’s autobiography, 'An American Life', portrays Mitterrand and his wife essentially in warm terms, with emphasis on how interpersonal rapport overcame specific disagreements on trade and deployment of missiles in Europe.
By contrast, France’s conservatives have often been self-consciously independent of U.S. policy. Most notably, President Charles de Gaulle was at odds with the Kennedy administration on every major strategic policy, including French nuclear weapons, the future of European integration, and the very structure of NATO.
De Gaulle was also in power during Eisenhower’s second term, but similar clashes were avoided. Ike developed reasonably good rapport with the sometimes insufferable French leader during the Second World War. While planning the Normandy invasion, American and British air commanders argued against heavy bombing that would kill many French civilians. Gen. Eisenhower was able to turn to Gen. de Gaulle for crucial support. Both deemed such bombing essential for success of the inherently very risky sea-based invasion.
American leaders should avoid advising our French friends on their domestic affairs, while oversimplifying their politics, and instead focus on rebuilding our alliance relationship, badly strained by the invasion of Iraq.
Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College and author of ”˜After the Cold War’ (NYU Press and Palgrave/Macmillan). He can be reached at acyr@carthage.edu